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aBStract
This paper explores the implications of the survival of the euro for the in-
ternational monetary system (IMS). Since the outset of the euro zone (EZ) cri-
sis, a new Berlin-Frankfurt axis is providing leadership in reforming the EZ´s 
governance. But, in doing so, it is Germanizing EZ peripheral economies. If 
the process is successfully completed, the EZ would become a more power-
ful actor in the IMS and the euro would be more attractive for international 
investors. However, it is unclear if this stronger EZ would be a stabilizing or a 
destabilizing force for the IMS. On the one hand, a more “German” euro-zone 
could have a structural current account surplus, and that could be deflationary 
and problematic. On the other hand, this reborn EZ will be much more inclined 
to regulate financial markets (following the ordoliberal German tradition) and, 
to some extent, to manage exchange rates. Finally it is unclear to what extent 
the EZ would be willing to politically promote the international role of the euro. 
Keywords: Monetary Union; Euro; Crisis; Exchange Rates; Reforms.
rESumEn
Este artículo analiza las implicaciones para el Sistema Monetario Inter-
nacional (SMI) de una zona euro (ZE) alemanizada. Desde el principio de la 
crisis en la ZE, un nuevo eje Berlín-Frankfurt está liderando la reforma de la 
gobernanza de la ZE. Pero, al hacerlo, está alemanizando las economías de 
la periferia. Si este proceso se completa con éxito, la ZE se convertirá en un 
actor mucho más importante en el SMI y el euro será más atractivo para los in-
versores internacionales. Sin embargo, es incierto si esta ZE reforzada será un 
factor de estabilidad o de inestabilidad en el SMI. Por una parte, una zona euro 
alemanizada podría tener un superávit estructural por cuenta corriente, lo que 
tendría un problemático efecto deflacionario sobre la economía mundial. Por 
otra parte, esta nueva ZE será más proclive a regular los mercados financieros 
(siguiendo la tradición ordoliberal alemana) y, en cierta medida, a coordinar 
los tipos de cambio. Por último, no es posible anticipar en qué medida la ZE 
estaría dispuesta a promover políticamente el uso internacional del euro.
Palabras clave: Unión Monetaria; Euro; Crisis; Tipos de cambio; Reformas.
JEL Classification: F15, F36, F41, F51, F59.
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1. introduction1
Both the Euro Zone (EZ) and the International Monetary System (IMS) are 
in transition. The EZ is undergoing a substantial internal reform to ensure its 
sustainability, a process that started at the beginning of the sovereign debt cri-
sis in Greece in 2010. This reform, which is proceeding gradually, includes the 
creation of a banking union, a limited fiscal union, a new role for the European 
Central Bank (ECB), and some form of economic and political union (Pickford 
et al. 2014). The IMS is also facing the need to readjust to ensure that, in an 
increasingly multi polar world in which the United States (US) and the dollar are 
loosing economic influence and political legitimacy (Kirshner 2014); the sys-
tem can function smoothly and facilitate liquidity, confidence and adjustment. 
This requires revising the functioning of the current unstable and dysfunctional 
flexible-dollar-standard, discussing the role of reserve assets, liquidity provi-
sions and capital controls; reforming the International Monetary Fund´s (IMF) 
internal governance, and designing new mechanisms to deal with global mac-
roeconomic imbalances in order to ensure monetary stability.
Even though both processes run independently, they are closely intercon-
nected because the EZ is, with the US and China, one of the three most influ-
ential actors of the IMS (it is the second largest economic bloc after the US, 
it issues the second most widely used reserve currency (the euro) and, when 
its member states coordinate their positions, it has the potential to dominate 
the decision making process at the IMF and the G20. Historically, however, the 
EZ has not played a preponderant role in international monetary and financial 
issues. It has left the leading role to the US. Since the breakdown of the Bret-
ton Woods regime in the early 1970s until the creation of the euro in 1999, 
European Union (EU) countries felt unable to substantially shape the evolution 
of the IMS. Once the euro was launched, EZ countries gained autonomy in 
international monetary affairs, but not necessarily influence. This was due in 
part to the fact that the IMS was still dominated by the US and by an Anglo-
Saxon approach to capitalism that was not dominant in continental Europe, 
and also to the fact that the EZ chose not to exercise monetary power at the 
1 I would like to thank Miguel Otero-Iglesias, Mattias Vermeiren and two anonymous referees for their 
comments and suggestions.
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international level (in fact, EZ countries never gave the euro a single voice in 
the international arena (Meuier and McNamara 2003) and they never used 
the single currency as a geopolitical instrument (Cohen 2010)). Therefore, for 
decades, EZ countries have been punching below their weight in international 
monetary affairs. And none of them felt really uncomfortable with the status 
quo because their preferences and interests were, to a certain degree, compat-
ible (albeit not coincident) with those of the US.
However, with the global financial crisis, the Great Recession and the sub-
sequent EZ sovereign debt crisis, things are rapidly changing in Europe. And 
these changes might have profound implications for the functioning of the IMS. 
The EU, and especially the EZ, has embarked itself in a reform process to com-
plete the ill-designed institutional architecture of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). A new Berlin-Frankfurt axis is leading the process (Steinberg and 
Molina 2012) in the creation of a banking union, a limited fiscal union, and 
some form of economic and political union, all of which are necessary condi-
tions for the survival of the euro (Matthijs and Blyth 2015). However, at the 
same time, this new hegemonic leadership is forcing a germanization of all 
EZ peripheral economies (France included) as a prerequisite to granting them 
financial solidarity (Beck 2013, Marsh 2013). In fact, the EZ has never wit-
nessed a process of coordinated fiscal adjustment and structural reforms as 
intense as the one that is happening in southern Europe since the beginning 
of the crisis in 2010. Moreover, the process is likely to continue and deepen 
as austerity and reforms are the bargaining chip used by Germany to accept 
some sort of a transfer union. So far, the EU has made substantial progress: it 
has created a European Monetary Fund (the European Stability Mechanism, 
ESM); it has reformed EZ fiscal and macroeconomic governance with the Fiscal 
Compact, the “Six Pack”, the “Two Pack”, and the European Semester; it has 
set the guidelines to increase competitiveness through the “Euro Plus Pact” 
and it has created the foundations of a Banking Union, with a single super-
visory mechanism and a single resolution fund (Pickford et al. 2014). Finally, 
since September 2012, the ECB has publicly stated that it will act as a lender 
of last resort when needed to ensure the survival of the euro and to make sure 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy functions correctly. Moreover, 
in early 2015, it launched an open-ended quantitative easing policy to prevent 
deflation.
The long term vision, as established by the so-called Four Presidents Re-
port in 2012 and updated by the so-called Five Presidents Report2 in 2015, 
presents a specific roadmap that, starting with the single financial supervi-
sory, would end up with an institutional reform that opens the door for po-
2 The Four Presidents are those of the European Council, the Commission, the Eurogroup and the 
ECB. The Fifth is the President of the European Parliament that joined his four colleagues in the 
2015 Report. Both Reports are available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf and at http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-
presidents-report_en.pdf 
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litical union under a Treaty Change.3 The final goal of the process is two fold. 
First, to complete the institutional architecture of EMU, which was designed in 
Maastricht, in order to make it a viable monetary union despite not being an 
optimal currency area (OCA). Second, to allow EZ countries to regain part of 
the economic sovereignty that they lost to financial markets, thus making the 
European integration process more legitimate. As the ECB president Mario 
Draghi puts it: 
“Countries with high debt and deficits should understand they have lost 
sovereignty a long time ago over their economic policies in a globalised 
world. Working together in a stability-oriented union actually means to 
regain sovereignty at a higher level (…) sharing common rules for them 
actually means to regain sovereignty in a shared way rather than pretend-
ing to have sovereignty they’ve lost a long time ago. That’s the point.” (FT, 
December 13, 2012)
The task will not be easy. Legitimizing the process of European monetary in-
tegration requires presenting European citizens with a credible narrative about 
why painful reforms are necessary. Moreover, it requires generating economic 
growth and jobs and reducing inequalities, something that, at the time of writ-
ing (July 2015), is far from happening. This paper, however, will not discuss this 
issue. It will assume, based on a number of qualified opinions (Bergsten 2012, 
Bergsten and Kirkegaard, INET 2012, Cohen 2012, Pickford et al. 2015) that 
the euro is too big to fail. This means that, difficult as it may seem, the reform 
process will move forward allowing the euro to survive and, in doing so, the 
EZ´s fiscal, economic and political institutions will strengthen. This will clearly 
make the euro more attractive for international investors because it will no 
longer be perceived as an orphan currency. However, as we will discuss in de-
tail, the stronger and reborn euro will largely reflect German preferences. And 
this will have profound implications for the IMS.
This is precisely what this paper explores. It argues that, for the first time 
in the history of European integration, German economic and geopolitical pref-
erences will dominate the EZ´s (and most likely the EU´s) foreign economic 
policies. And this change will present substantial challenges to the current IMS, 
which since the late 1970s has been largely dominated by an Anglo-Saxon ap-
proach to capitalism which is not fully shared by economic and political elites 
in continental Europe. While it is unlikely that this new situation will trigger 
big conflicts in the IMS, tensions are likely to arise in the areas where German 
(and to a less extent French) ideas differ most from liberal Anglo-Saxon views: 
exchange rate coordination, macroeconomic adjustment, and financial market 
regulation. Conversely, a reborn euro might facilitate the governance reform of 
the IMF because (limited) political union might lead to the consolidation of a 
single external voice for the euro, which could lead to a single representation 
for EZ countries at IMF, and also at the G20.
3 For a debate on the problems of this process, especially with the issue of political union see Dullien 
and Torreblanca (2012).
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In order to understand how this process might came about, we will first 
analyze how the crisis has shifted the balance of power in the EZ from debtor 
to creditor countries, disproportionally increasing Germany´s relative influence 
within Europe. We will argue that Germany has become a regional hegemon, 
capable of exercising more “structural” power than any other country in the 
history of the EU (Kundnani 2015). However, Germany does not feel comfort-
able with this new scenario and it is not willing to provide some of the public 
goods that the EZ requires (Beck 2013). Second, we will explore what Germany 
is trying to do with this newly acquired power. In particular, we will analyze 
how it is taking advantage of his privilege position not only to obtain short-
term economic and financial benefits, but also to push for reforms that will 
incorporate specific features of the German ordoliberal model of capitalism 
(Bonefeld 2012) in other EZ countries. The core of the paper will be dedicated 
to speculate about how this new EZ could try to shape the reform of the IMS.
We will argue that if the euro survives its international use will grow, but 
that Germany (and thus the EZ) will be reluctant to exercise leadership in the 
IMS or to take full advantage of the monetary power associated to issuing a 
leading reserve currency. This is due to the fact that a Germanized EZ might 
adopt a geo-economic and neo-mercantilist economic strategy based primar-
ily on export-led growth, which might not be compatible with the high levels 
of exchange rate volatility associated with issuing the dominant international 
reserve currency.
In addition, and connected to the previous point, due to the structural 
reforms in southern Europe, the EZ could have a structural current account 
surplus. This would exacerbate the problem of global macroeconomic imbal-
ances and create deflationary pressures in the world economy, thus putting 
more pressure on the US, which will remain the main consumer of last resort 
unless China dramatically increases its internal demand. Should this happen, 
the classical political economy question “who adjusts?” could cause tensions 
in the IMS.
Finally, the EZ could be much more inclined than in the past to intervene 
in international foreign exchange and financial markets according to the or-
doliberal model of capitalism prevailing in German, which exhibits features of 
a coordinated market economy substantially different from the Anglo-Saxon 
liberal market economic model (Bonefeld 2012, Duillen and Guerot 2012). 
This could mean that the EZ could be inclined to manage exchange rates (a 
goal shared by China and other emerging markets but not by the US or the UK) 
and to strongly regulate international financial markets, even promoting the 
establishment of an international financial transaction tax. 
In sum, a reborn EZ will have more international monetary power, but it is 
unclear if it will be a stabilizing or a destabilizing force for the IMS.
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2. a nEw union of crEditorS and dEBtorS
For half a century, the EU has been a political project underpinned by soli-
darity and confidence. Rich northern countries were willing to show a remark-
able level of solidarity with their less well-off southern neighbors in a combina-
tion of perceived self-interest and trust in them. Peripheral countries that had 
emerged from authoritarian regimes used their EU membership to consolidate 
their democracies and promote economic growth. This, in turn, gave rise to 
large and stable markets for the core-countries’ exports. It was a win-win situa-
tion. Northern solidarity paid off because the countries in the south generally 
behaved as expected. It was an EU dominated by a balanced Franco-German 
axis. There was no hegemonic power, but a division of labor in which France’s 
strategic vision and Germany’s economic power were compatible and facili-
tated progress towards deeper integration.
However, the EZ debt crisis has dramatically changed the nature of Euro-
pean integration. The combination of poor financial regulation and an incom-
plete design of the euro have led EMU to the brink of collapse, forcing the EZ 
to move forwards decisively in order to avoid catastrophe (Pisani-Ferry 2014). 
However, the institutional changes that the EZ has been implementing since 
2010 to convince the markets that the euro is an irreversible project do not 
have the same underlying logic as in previous steps towards integration. North-
ern creditor countries, led by Germany, have increased their bargaining power 
vis a vis southern countries, creating a new decision-making process in Europe 
in which creditors set the rules and debtors have little option but to follow what 
the north dictates (Matthijs and Blyth 2015, Thompson 2013, Wolf 2014). 
They have become ‘decision takers’. In fact, the ‘community method’ has been 
weakened and a new asymmetric intergovernmentalism has emerged, in which 
a hegemonic Germany sets the direction, timing, speed and scope of reforms 
with little or no counterweights (Steinberg and Molina 2012).
This can be seen in the negotiations on the Germany-sponsored Fiscal 
Compact (which constitutionalizes the German debt brake and reduces the 
scope for fiscal discretion), the banking union (in which a limited common fis-
cal backstop will only be implemented after 2020 and in which there is no 
common insurance deposit guarantee system (Howarth and Quaglia 2013), 
essentially reflecting German interests), the ESFS/ESM (which is arguably too 
small and too inflexible, again reflecting Germany’s goal of providing only the 
minimum level of solidarity required to avoid a EZ collapse) and the “Six pack” 
and “Two pack” negotiations, in which, for instance, Germany has dictated that 
the macroeconomic imbalances procedure will not be symmetric (i.e., large 
current account deficits are considered to be ‘more dangerous’ than large cur-
rent account surpluses (Moschella 2014)).
Similarly, Germany has so far kept out of the negotiating agenda propos-
als which would have satisfied the preferences of the Mediterranean countries 
(France included), such as a partial mutualization of debt (in the form of Eu-
robonds or a Redemption Fund), a EZ fiscal capacity to deal with asymmetric 
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shocks or a strategy to smoothly absorb with legacy assets in the financial sys-
tem (only in 2015, when the Juncker Commission took office, it did accept the 
launch of a limited pan-European Investment Plan, the so-called Juncker Plan).
Finally, the ECB’s reluctance to intervene on a continuous basis in the debt 
markets to reduce financing costs for the EZ’s periphery (at least until Septem-
ber 2012 when it launched its OMT programme) has forced these countries to 
adopt austerity measures and implement structural reforms in order to be able 
to raise money in the international markets (De Grauwe 2011). In fact, the EZ 
has never witnessed a process of coordinated fiscal adjustment and structural 
reforms as intense as the one that is currently taking place in southern Europe 
since the beginning of the crisis in 2010. And the process is likely to continue 
and deepen as austerity and reforms are the bargaining chip used by Germany 
to accept some sort of a transfer union in the long run.
In sum, the old Franco-German axis has been replaced by a Berlin-Frankfurt 
axis, which is Germanizing the south’s economies through austerity and struc-
tural reforms and, at the same time, is creating a new governance framework 
for the EZ, which is essentially an extension of the German view of capitalism 
(Wolf 2014). This is not the first time that Germany has tried this. As Marsh 
(2009) or Pisani Ferry (2014) show, the creation of the euro itself had as one of 
its indirect goals to promote supply-side structural reforms in southern Europe. 
By eliminating the possibility of devaluing their currencies to solve competitive-
ness and growth problems, countries will have more incentives to reform their 
labor and products markets and to improve their education systems. Unfortu-
nately, as Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos (2013) demonstrate, the 
opposite occurred. Peripheral countries experienced an investment boom that 
created exactly the wrong incentives for reforms.
To underpin, justify and legitimize its actions, Germany has created a nar-
rative of the crisis according to which the EZ´s problems are mainly the result 
of profligacy and competitiveness loses in the south, not of an ill-designed EZ 
or the global financial crisis. According to this diagnosis, the solution to the 
crisis, given that it is too risky for the EU to break the euro and too costly for 
Germany to exit, is to force southern European economies to adopt certain 
features of the German socio-economic model (Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013) 
(and to provide them with limited assistance in cases of market turmoil). In par-
ticular, Germany´s own reforms in the 2000s, which made its economy more 
flexible and competitive, appear, combined with austerity, as the blue print for 
the reforms in the south (Wolf 2014). 
Therefore, not only is Germany more powerful in relational terms than any 
other country has been in Europe since World War II, it is also acquiring struc-
tural power, as defined by Strange (1988), by diffusing its own ideas about 
what is the best strategy to exit the crisis.4 So far, it has not completely suc-
4 ”Structural power in short confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to 
shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate 
enterprises” (Strange 1988).
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ceeded. Alternative narratives of the crisis still exist (European Commission 
2012, INET 2012, Moravcsik 2012, Wolf 2014, De Grauwe 2011). However, 
once Germany has realized that it is trapped in the euro (which has also ben-
efited its export-oriented sector enormously), it has been trying to use the 
crisis as an opportunity to radically transform the economic structure of south-
ern EZ members by forcing the adoption of rules that will reduce the policy 
space for implementing policies that are divergent from the Coordinated Mar-
ket Economy/Ordoliberal model predominant in Germany.5 Therefore, auster-
ity, limited solidarity, reluctance to accept higher levels of inflation, or labor 
market reforms are instruments to attain its goals and consolidate its incipient 
structural power.
In fact, as Vermeiren (2012) shows, the original design of EMU allowed Ger-
many to increase its monetary power because of the nature of its coordinated 
market economy even before the EZ crisis started. In particular, Germany´s 
flexible labor market and export-oriented economy (with a comparative advan-
tage in goods and services that do not compete primarily in price (Bonatti and 
Fracasso 2013)), allowed Berlin to reap more gains from EMU than southern 
European countries. As graph 1 shows, German exports (as a percentage of 
GDP) grew dramatically with the introduction of the euro (rising from 27,1% in 
1999 to 43,5% in 2008), while Spanish, French, and Italian exports remained 
stable or even fall during the same period. 
graph 1: Export aS a % of gdp (Ez´S largESt countriES)
Source: World Bank
5 For a discussion of the different models of capitalism see Hall and Soskice (2001) and Hanke et al. 
(2007). See Vermeiren (2012) for an application of this literature to the distribution of power within 
Europe after the creation of the euro. For an updated version of the peculiarities of the German-
Ordoliberal model of capitalism and its implications for the EZ crisis see Bonefeld (2012) and Duillen 
and Guerot (2012).  
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This, in turn, generated large intra EZ macroeconomic imbalances, with 
Germany emerging as the main creditor country and Spain, Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal as debtors (graph 2). When the debt crisis started, southern Eu-
ropean countries realized that they were in a week bargaining position and 
Germany was able to increase its influence. 
graph 2: nEt intErnational invEStmEnt poSition aS a % of gdp
Source: Eurostat
In addition, besides this long-term strategy, Germany has tactically used the 
economic problems of the periphery to obtain short-term advantages and to 
preserve its financial interests. Firstly, financial instability in southern Europe has 
reduced Germany´s own financing costs because of capital flight from the pe-
riphery to the core (Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012). In fact, Germany, just like 
the US, is now enjoying the “exorbitant privilege” of issuing the safest debt of 
the EZ, but unlike the US, it is not willing to provide sufficient public goods for 
the EU. Secondly, Germany, as the largest creditor country, has consistently re-
fused to accept inflation to facilitate deleveraging and has set the timing and the 
conditions of the Greek debt restructuring, thus preserving its financial interests. 
Finally, and related to the previous point, it has not tried to reverse the apprecia-
tion of the euro despite the damage that the strong currency has done to south-
ern European countries´ exports (especially Italy, Portugal and France), because 
an appreciated euro does not damage so much the competitiveness of German 
exports due to the high value added nature of the goods and services it sells 
outside the EZ. Only once the EZ has entered deflation, has the Bundesbank (re-
luctantly) accepted that the ECB adopted a more expansionary monetary policy 
to depreciate the euro (Vermeiren and Steinberg 2015).
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3. how would a gErmanizEd EuropE affEct thE imS?
Although every EZ country will maintain its idiosyncratic characteristics, if 
the structural reforms across Europe continue (particularly in labor markets, 
products markets, financial markets, taxation and pensions) and if the EZ man-
ages to increase its level of financial, fiscal, economic, and political integration, 
there would be important implications for the IMS. We will dedicate the rest of 
the paper to discuss them.
3.1 a Strong and morE attractivE Euro, But not a rESErvE currEncy
So far, the euro has been no rival for the dollar. Despite having emerged 
as the second most used international currency worldwide, it has a number of 
structural limitations: economic factors such as insufficient financial integra-
tion and lack of liquidity in its debt markets, political shortcomings related 
to having a monetary union without a fiscal and political union, and limited 
European military ambitions (Cohen 2010, Eichengreen 2011, Otero-Iglesias 
and Steinberg 2012). Even though the global financial crisis started in the US, 
market participants and official reserve holders have regarded the dollar as a 
safe haven throughout the crisis, and the dollar´s structural position has even 
strengthened since 2008 (Helleiner 2015).
The “military” factor is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future in the 
EZ. Budget cuts in Europe are undermining military spending and the EU still 
relies in the US and NATO for its basic security. However, as mentioned above, 
the EZ debt crisis has triggered a radical transformation in the governance in-
stitutions that underpin the euro. It has also opened the door for the creation 
of some sort of Eurobonds/euro bills, which could eventually make European 
financial markets deeper, wider, and more liquid.6 In fact, as Otero-Iglesias and 
Steinberg (2012) show, financial elites in key dollar-holding countries would 
be willing to buy large quantities of euro-denominated assets to diversify away 
from the dollar if the EZ were to issue a debt instrument comparable to the US 
10-year T-bill and if the euro had a fiscal and economic union to ensure its long 
term sustainability. 
Therefore, it could be argued that, from a purely economic perspective, the 
euro could increase its role as a reserve currency if it consolidates its banking 
and fiscal union and ends up issuing some sort of common debt instrument. 
And it will most likely do so, as these reforms are deemed necessary for its long 
run survival (Blyth and Mattijs 2015).
The question, however, is, to what extent European authorities would be 
willing to politically promote the international role of the euro. This is relevant 
because a currency can only become the top international currency if there is 
6 Debt issued by the ESM can be considered as a pseudo Eurobonds. However, so far the ESM has 
issued relatively small quantities of assets and some doubts about ESM governance and guarantees 
preclude it from becoming a liquid and well-understood instrument.
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an active political commitment by the issuing authorities (Eichengreen 2011). 
And, so far, only the US in the XXth Century and the UK (in the previous cen-
tury) had been willing to do so. Using Cohen´s (2006) definition of monetary 
power, it is clear that the consolidation of the euro has (and will) give the EZ 
more autonomy in international monetary affairs. But, will it give it more influ-
ence? That largely depends on the balance of power within the EZ, thus on 
German political preferences. 
Issuing an international reserve currency has both costs and benefits (Co-
hen 2010). Benefits include flexibility in macroeconomic policy, increased re-
venues from seigniorage, and greater political influence on the international 
arena. Costs, however, are related to the fact that the issuer of an international 
currency faces the risks of imported inflation and competitiveness losses due 
to currency revaluation. This means that countries may choose not to promote 
the internationalization of their monies. This was the case with the Deutsch-
mark (Marsh 1992) and the Japanese Yen (Grimes 2003), and, to a certain 
extent, is also the case with the euro today. The ECB remains officially agnostic 
on the internationalization of the euro and different European leaders have 
traditionally had different views. French officials have often expressed their 
interest in consolidating the euro as a serious rival to the dollar, while Germany 
has tended to have a lower profile, rarely including geopolitical considerations 
in their currency discourse, which stresses above all macroeconomic stability 
and low inflation.7
Therefore, if a stronger Berlin allows the German positions to prevail, it is 
unlikely that the EZ engages in a strategy to politically promote the internationa-
lization of the euro. Market forces may well increase the appeal of the European 
currency, especially if the ECB maintains its anti-inflationary stance and if Eu-
robonds markets are created. However, without German willingness to exercise 
monetary power internationally, the euro will, most likely, remain a secondary 
international currency, probably competing with the RMB in the medium term.
3.2. thE Ez in Structural currEnt account SurpluS
Global macroeconomic imbalances have been a persistent problem of the 
IMS in the last decade. Excess savings in China, Japan, Germany, oil-exporting 
countries and some other emerging powers in Asia and excess spending in 
the US, the UK and the peripheral EZ countries were, together with financial 
deregulation, key causes of the global financial crisis (Wolf 2014, Rajan 2010).8 
The Great Recession helped to correct global imbalances mainly by reduc-
ing imports in deficit countries. However, since 2011, these imbalances have 
7 There is also an ongoing debate regarding the value of the Exchange rate of the euro, in which 
France (and Italy) tends to complain about the strength of the euro in the context of current currency 
wars, while Germany maintains silence and tries to protect the independence of the ECB.
8 Low interest rates in the US and excess savings in emerging countries gave rise to a glut of liquidity 
that ended up generating a bubble in asset markets, which was also fed by financial deregulation and 
the creation of new financial instruments.
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reappeared (see graph 3). Although China is rapidly reducing its current ac-
count surplus and the Great Recession in the US contributed to reduce its cur-
rent account deficit, structural changes in the EZ, aimed at increasing exports, 
have become a new source of global macroeconomic imbalances.
In the past decade, the US and China have been the most vocal powers in 
criticising the status quo, sometimes called Bretton Woods II, but for different 
reasons. The US complained about China´s exchange rate policy and China 
claimed that irresponsible expansionary monetary and fiscal US policies repre-
sent a risk to global stability and to their dollar-denominated assets (Steinberg 
2013). Nevertheless, both countries seem to be confortable with the current 
situation and have not taken rhetorical confrontation further (the US has not 
introduced unilateral protectionist measures and China has not sold its dollar-
denominated assets).
graph 3. gloBal macroEconomic imBalancES – country groupingS
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2014
So far, the EZ has not participated in this debate. At the G-20 meetings, it 
has insisted that China should revalue the RMB, but with much less emphasis 
than the US. Since its creation, the EZ has had a balanced current account 
because the external surplus of “northern” countries was compensated by the 
external financing needs of the countries in the periphery (in fact, Germany is 
the only large country in the world that has not contributed to global rebalanc-
ing). EZ countries have always resisted a discussion in the G-20 about intra 
EZ macroeconomic imbalances because they consider this issue as internal 
(just like health care reform in the US) and have defended that the EZ has not 
contributed to global imbalances. This, however, is rapidly changing. While Ger-
many and its northern neighbours are expected to maintain large surpluses, 
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structural reforms in southern countries are likely to generate external sur-
pluses in these traditionally deficit countries as well.
For instance, Spain, which ran a current account deficit of over 10% of 
GDP in 2007, moved to surplus in 2014 due to the internal devaluation and 
austerity policies that depressed domestic demand and boosted exports. This 
contributed to an overall current account surplus of the whole EZ of 262 billion 
euros in 2014, a surplus larger than that of China. As graph 3 illustrates, the 
IMF projects that by 2019, the EZ will have a current account surplus of almost 
300 billion euros (2% of its GDP). Even though Germany would be the largest 
source of that surplus, no large EZ country is expected to have a significant 
current account deficit (see graph 4). 
graph 4. currEnt account imBalancES in thE Euro arEa 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 2014.
The implications of the EZ in a structural external surplus for the IMS would 
be remarkable. Should that happen, and if China and Japan do not begin to 
run current account deficits (something that is not likely to happen soon), the 
global economy will have all of its major economic blocs except the US trying 
to lend to the rest of the world. So the question will inevitable become, who is 
the buyer? Either the US consumer remerges once again as the world´s con-
sumer of last resort, or the world economy would have to accept slower eco-
nomic growth and deflationary tensions, as argued by the proponents of the 
“Secular Stagnation” hypothesis (Teulings and Baldwin 2014). But, as the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and the long deflation in Japan in the 1990s show, 
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declining prices in an environment of high debt could increase the problems 
of the financial sector in advanced countries and drag economic growth even 
more. In that scenario geopolitical tensions are likely to increase, with currency 
wars, rising protectionism, and redistributive conflicts between debtor and 
creditor countries becoming more acute. In particular, there could be growing 
tensions between the US and the EZ, which have traditionally cooperated in 
international monetary issues. Finally, an EZ behaving more “like China” could 
open the door to more exchange rate and regulatory cooperation between the 
EZ, China and the other BRICS countries. We explore these issues in the next 
section.
3.3 a morE intErvEntioniSt Ez in thE imS? 
One of the key philosophical difference between the Anglo-Saxon model of 
capitalism and that prevalent in continental Europe is its trust in markets. Both 
views agree that the free market economy is the best way to generate innova-
tion and growth. However, for liberal Anglo-Saxons, markets tend to be self-sta-
bilizing and relatively well self-regulated, requiring only small doses of govern-
ment intervention (domestically, these views correspond to the liberal market 
economies of the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001)). 
Contrarily, continental Europeans tend to believe that markets should be more 
heavily regulated in order to generate adequate (and legitimate) outcomes. 
Specifically, in the German ordoliberal tradition, the free market economy re-
quires the existence of a “strong state – a state that restrains competition and 
secures the social and ideological preconditions of economic liberty” Bonefeld 
2012:1). Thus, there is an emphasis in the need for rules and coordination to 
avoid adverse market outcomes that could eventually delegitimize the system, 
which correspond to the Coordinated Market Economies within the varieties of 
capitalism literature. This view, to a certain extent, is shared by other continen-
tal European countries (especially France) and with a number of varieties of so 
called State Capitalism that prevail in some emerging powers.
Before the global financial crisis, the Anglo-Saxon view of capitalism was 
dominant, especially in the western world. However, the severity of the crisis 
and of the Great Recession (2008-2010) has triggered an ideological shift in 
favor of more regulated markets (Rodrik 2011). As a result, the international 
community has been trying to establish new rules and enhanced coordination 
mechanisms to improve the functioning of international markets, especially in 
the areas of money and finance. Besides the financial reform implemented in 
the US and the EU (which aims at improved and extend regulation), the IMF 
has accepted the use of some forms of capital controls, the EU has estab-
lished an international financial transactions tax and has banned short-selling 
temporarily, and the Bassel III accord has increased capital requirements for 
banks. In emerging markets, neo-mercantilist strategies are becoming more 
common and they even seem to have gained legitimacy because their capacity 
to generate relatively successful economic outcomes. It is still early to know 
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to what extend these new forms of regulation are moving the world economy 
towards deglobalization. What is clear, however, is that, in the realm of ideas, 
the German view of Capitalism is gaining influence vis à vis the Anglo-Saxon, 
and this could have important implications for the IMS in the coming decades 
(Kirshner 2014).9
First, in the area of exchange rate coordination, the world economy could 
witness a higher degree of collaboration to manage exchange rates. There have 
been numerous recent proposals to introduce some level of exchange rate 
coordination (Mundell 2005, Padoa-Schioppa 2010, Camdessus et al. 2011, 
United Nations 2009). However, they have usually been rejected by the US, 
who is comfortable with the current regime, in which the status of the dol-
lar and the flexibility of exchange rates allow it to use its monetary power. 
Emerging markets, on the other hand, from China to Brazil, have repeatedly 
called for more coordination to avoid the adverse externalities of American 
macroeconomic policies (Zhou 2009). In Europe (and especially in France), 
there has been remarkable sympathy for the idea of coordinating exchange 
rates (Otero-Iglesias and Zhang 2014), a view not always shared by Germany, 
who considers that coordination should not undermine the independence of 
the ECB. However, as discussed earlier, the EZ has never had a strong position 
towards this issue, in part due to the institutional weaknesses of the EZ. Should 
this change in the future, the EZ could come closer to the position of emerging 
markets, thus leaving the US with limited allies (only the UK) to resist changes 
in the IMS that include more monetary cooperation. And even if the EZ does 
not align itself with emerging markets in this issue, the eventual creation of an 
EZ chair at the IMF (something that could well happen in the foreseeable fu-
ture should the EZ moves towards some form of political union), could greatly 
increase European influence in shaping the future IMS.
Second, in the area of financial regulation, EZ countries have repeatedly 
showed their intention to curtail markets. In fact, after failing to convince the 
other members of the G-20 to pass an international financial transactions tax, 
they decided to implement it in the European Continent in 2012. And in the 
broader area of financial regulation, EZ collaboration with some emerging 
markets that also seem to distrust the risks involved in sophisticated financial 
derivates or excessively lax forms of control for portfolio investments, could 
improve. This could also trigger confrontation with the US and the UK.
9 It is also important to mention, however, that Germany has traditional been reluctant to exercise a 
leadership role in the IMS or to coordinate its macroeconomic policies with other G7 countries. See 
Putnam and Bayne (1987) for details, particularly about the 1978 Bonn Summit of the G7 and for 
the Louvre and Plaza Agreements of the mid-1980s. 
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4. concluSion
This paper has argued that the transformation that the EZ is experiencing 
as a result of its crisis could radically transform the balance of power in the 
IMS. The European debt crisis has created a new EZ of debtors and creditors 
in which a new Berlin-Frankfurt axis has partially replaced the old (and more 
balanced) Paris-Berlin axis. Germany, thus, has emerged as a hegemonic power 
in the EZ, and it is using its newly acquired power to establish a new rules-
based system of European economic governance that, if fully implemented, 
would partially Germanize the economies of southern Europe. Germany, how-
ever, does not feel fully comfortable with its new role. Since the creation of 
the European Economic Community in the late 1950s Germany has always 
preferred to “hide” behind Europe than to lead it. But it has realized that the 
current financial instability in the EZ provides an opportunity to force politically 
difficult reforms onto southern Europe, reforms that it thinks are indispensa-
ble to ensure the success of the EZ in a global economy in which emerging 
markets exhort greater competition in a declining West. Therefore, it has as-
sumed a (temporarily) new leadership role whose main goal is to establishment 
a set to (irreversible) new governance rules that restrict the political space of 
EZ governments to pursue policies that Germany considers damaging for the 
strength of the European economy. These rules, which have been proposed by 
the European Commission and in which the European Parliament has also been 
involved, reflect, however, the new balance of power within the EZ: southern 
European countries have not been able to shape them as much as creditor 
countries. As a result, the Fiscal Compact, the “Six Pack” and the “Two Pack”, 
the intergovernmental ESM and the timing and sequencing of the Banking Un-
ion mainly reflect German preferences. It remains to be seen if, after these 
new rules are in place and the EZ moves towards deeper economic integration 
in the fiscal, financial and economic spheres, Germany decides to take a step 
back and abandons its attitude of explicitly leadership or not. However, even if 
it does, it would still be able to exercise structural power if its economic ideas 
become embedded in new EZ rules and institutions. 
The second part of the paper has been dedicated to speculate about the 
implications of a reborn and Germanized EZ for the IMS. We have argued that 
it is unclear whether the role of the EZ would provide more or less stability. On 
the one hand, a greater internationalization of the euro (which would be based 
on market decisions and not on an explicitly political support of the European 
currency by European authorities) could facilitate the emergence of a com-
petitive multicurrency IMS, which could provide more stability than the current 
flexible-dollar standard. On the other hand, a Germanized EZ could have a 
structural current account surplus that could exert a deflationary pressure in 
the global economy. This, in turn, could trigger transatlantic confrontation and 
open the door for some collaboration between the EZ and some emerging mar-
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